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ARGUMENT 
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE 
TRIAL COURT ON REMAND. 
Contrary to Appellee's assertion, Appellant properly preserved the previously 
stated issues in the trial court on remand. 
On March 24, 2009 Appellant filed a Motion to Strike Petitioner's Proposed 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In the Motion the 
Appellant made the argument that the Petitioner had completely rewritten the 
Court's decision to conform to what she requested at trial instead of following the 
mandate of the Appellate Court for more detailed findings concerning petitioner's 
financial needs and the Court's rationale for excluding Appellant's salary from 
Walden University from the calculation of Appellant's income. {See Motion to 
Strike Petitioner's proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law). 
Additionally, on July 15,2009, during oral arguments pertaining to the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the trial court on remand, counsel for 
Appellant stated, 
I don't think it's appropriate to come in here and talk about new 
evidence, developments that may or may not have occurred since the trial 
in March of 2007. Rather, the clock stopped in March of 2007. We have 
a record, and the question now before the Court is, is there sufficient 
evidence in that record to support the findings and conclusion and the 
order that judge Cornaby entered? (emphasis added) Tr. 22: 14-20. 
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These timely objections at the trial court on remand effectively preserved the 
right of the Appellant, Dr. Hayes, to appeal the trial court on remand under the 
"law of the case doctrine" as well as the "mandate rule." Additionally, the timely 
Motion to Strike Petitioner's Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made available to Dr. Hayes the challenge to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of law that the trial court on remand entered. 
THE APPELLANT PROPERLY MARSHALED EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND ARE 
UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
In a case that involves the adequacy of alimony award the trial court is to 
consider several factors. Those are (i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income, 
and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994) citing, Chambers v. Chambers. 
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). When a challenge to the alimony amount is 
made the Appellate Court will look to see if the trial court has made adequate 
findings as to the factors listed above and when insufficient findings have been 
made the Appellate Court has generally reversed the alimony amount, unless 
pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018,1025 (Utah 
App. 1993). Appellant in the case at hand is challenging the first and second 
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factors in the award for alimony, particularly in light of the Appellate Court's 
mandate to the trial court on remand to do exactly that. 
The trial court on remand must state that the calculation of monthly 
expenses and financial needs for the recipient is reasonable and must explain how 
it arrived at the monthly amount, or at least from the record, allow us to make the 
determination for ourselves. Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3 117 (Utah App. 
2009) citing, Rehnv.Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, f 7 (Utah App. 1999). 
The following table is based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of both Judge Cornaby and Judge Medley: 
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Dr. Hayes Findings of Fact 
Judge Comaby 
Annual salary of 
$75,000 or $6,250 
per month 
To pay $1,200 per 
month in alimony 
to Ms. Baum 
$565 per month 
for child support 
The court will not 
structure a 
property award 
based on the 
parties relative 
contributions 
Judge Medley 
Annual Salary of 
$91,000 
$66,600 from 
Primary job and 
summer job 
$21,000 from 
Walden University 
To pay $2,475 per 
month in alimony 
to Ms. Baum 
Judge Medley then 
introduced new 
evidence that was 
not present at the 
first trial about the 
name on the 
website 
After tax needs of 
$2,369 
Dr. Hayes has been 
able to pay for 
many lifestyle 
amenities during 
this trial. 
Pay child support in 
the amount of $700 
This alimony cost 
does exceed Ms. 
Baum's reasonable 
needs1 
Ms. Baum's Findings of Fact 
Judge Cornaby 
Her claim of paying 
$800 on her 
hypothetical 
alimony award and 
other expenses that 
while ideal are not 
actually being paid 
was not be included 
in reasonable needs. 
Imputed income of 
$750 per month 
She received 85% 
of the parties' home 
and contents thereof 
Judge Medley 
Her after tax 
reasonable needs 
of $3,715 and, 
after imputed 
income, $2,265 
Imputed income 
of $750 per month 
Even though there 
are costs not 
being paid the 
only costs that 
will be excluded 
are the $409 
claimed for 
prescriptions 
without insurance. 
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(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law). 
The Appellate Court determined that the trial court needed to make more 
detailed findings regarding the Appellee's financial needs and why the income 
from Walden University was excluded. Baum v. Haves, 196 P.3d 612, 616 (Utah 
App. 2008). However, the trial court on remand made less findings regarding the 
financial needs of the Appellee than were made at the first trial. Instead the trial 
court on remand accepted the list of reasonable needs as submitted by the 
Appellee. Even though the trial court on remand did say that those needs were 
reasonable, the court did not explain how it arrived at that conclusion nor did the 
trial court on remand explain why its ruling was different from the first trial. 
More importantly, the trial court on remand highly scrutinized the expenses 
of the Appellant and seemed to base his award for alimony on the way that the 
Appellant was living his life and not on any detailed findings regarding the 
financial needs for the Appellee. In other words, the trial court on remand did 
NOT follow the Appellate Court's mandate and followed its own path to determine 
alimony. 
The failure to adequately consider the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient and her ability to support herself is an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. 
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Paffel 732 P.2d 96,101 (Utah 1986). The trial court on remand also included 
information that the Appellant's name was still on Walden University's website. 
This information was not present at the trial and not evidence before the court. It 
appears the trial court on remand relied heavily upon that information. Use of that 
information in its Findings of Fact is a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
In conclusion, the trial court on remand did not do what it was directed to do 
by the Appellate court: to make specific findings of the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse. 
Furthermore, the Appellant has properly marshaled evidence mat 
substantially support the conclusion that the trial court on remand abused their 
discretion in determining the alimony amount. 
THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALTERING THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD BY INCLUDING 
APPELLANT'S SECONDARY INCOME. 
The trial court on remand determined that Appellant's secondary income 
should be included in determining the alimony and child support amounts. The 
court then used the same income figures in re-calculating child support. 
Typically, a court only looks at income derived from "the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2), now Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-12-203(2). There can be exceptions, but the court needs to make specific 
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findings to justify the variance. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 759 
(Utah App 1998). 
Appellee points out that income from a secondary job, overtime work or past 
earnings may be used in determining the amounts of alimony and child support. 
Breinholtv.Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 880-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and Cox v. 
Cox, 877 P.2d 1262,1267-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, just because these 
other sources of income should be considered does not mean that they are always 
included. 
The current case differs from the facts in Jensen v. Bowcut 892 P.2d 1053, 
1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), where the husband's second job was virtually required 
and was, in essence, a necessary extension of his professional duties. Also, the 
second job did not jeopardize his primary job. However, in the current case 
Appellant's second job is contrary to the conditions of his primary job at 
Washington State University and as such may jeopardize his primary job. 
The Appellee also makes the argument that revised alimony and child 
support amounts are based off of the Appellee's financial contributions during the 
parties' marriage; her diminished ability to work due to her disability; her needs as 
the custodial parent; and the disparity in the share of the Appellant's income. See 
Howell v. Howell 806 p.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991). However, in Howell v. 
Howell the parties in that case had not lived beyond their means and there was 
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enough income from the husband to still meet the necessities of both parties. In 
the case at hand it has been established that both parties have lived beyond their 
means even during the marriage. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f 9. 
As well as in the case at hand there is not enough income to meet either of the 
parties to live as they did prior to their separation. Id. 
Here, the trial court on remand made no findings of fact at all to address the 
change in child support. While a court may look at income in addition to 40 hours 
in some circumstances, the trial court on remand gave no indication what that 
circumstance may be. 
It does appear that the Court was relying heavily upon the anticipation that 
Appellant would continue to enjoy his second job at Walden University. That 
anticipation was based largely upon the court's finding that Appellant was still 
listed on the website. In other words, much of the trail court on remand's basis for 
increasing the child support (including the supplemental income) was information 
which was not in evidence before the court. 
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
Appellee suggests that Appellant is arguing the trial court on remand had no 
discretion to make new findings. That is not correct. Appellant is arguing, 
however, that, if the trial court on remand is intending to change its ruling, it must 
first make adequate findings of fact and then explain in detail why it is choosing to, 
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in effect, reverse itself. The trial court on remand did NOT make any explanation 
of why it opted to completely change its ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully asks that this Court reverse 
and remand this case to make actual detailed findings about Appellee's claimed 
expenses as well as reasoning for excluding the Appellant's second income from 
Walden University as was mandated by the first appeal in this case. Further, 
Appellant requests this court to determine that any findings made by the trial court 
on remand which relied upon Appellant's name being on Walden University's 
website to be prejudicial and an abuse of discretion. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2010. 
RANDALL LEI 
Attorney for Appellant 
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